United Nations A/64/359–S/2009/470

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
18 September 2009

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-fourth session
Items 34 and 142 of the provisional agenda*

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations

Security Council
Sixty-fourth year

Support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. In its presidential statement of 18 March 2009 (S/PRST/2009/3), the Security Council reiterated its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, recognized the important role of the African Union in the settlement of conflicts in Africa, and expressed its support for peace initiatives conducted by the African Union. In this context, the Council requested that I submit a report no later than 18 September 2009 on practical ways to provide effective support to the African Union in undertaking peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations, including a detailed assessment of the recommendations contained in the report dated 31 December 2008 of the African Union-United Nations panel established under Security Council resolution 1809 (2008) to consider the modalities for support to African Union peacekeeping operations (A/63/666-S/2008/813).

2. The report of the panel contained a number of recommendations on the modalities for support to African Union peacekeeping, including: (a) concrete steps to be taken by the United Nations and the African Union to strengthen their mutual relationship and develop a more effective partnership when addressing issues on the joint agenda; (b) the use of United Nations-assessed funding for African Union-led and United Nations-authorized peacekeeping operations on a case-by-case basis, for

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up to six months, to be provided mainly in kind and only when there is an intention to transition the mission to a United Nations peacekeeping operation; (c) the establishment of a voluntary-based multi-donor trust fund to focus on comprehensive capacity-building; (d) the consideration by the African Union to develop its logistics capacity through innovative options; and (e) the establishment of a joint United Nations-African Union team to examine the detailed modalities to implement its recommendations.

3. As noted in my 7 April 2008 report on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security (S/2008/186), the United Nations recognizes that partnerships with regional organizations, based on the comparative strengths of each organization, are a critical factor in meeting the demands of modern peacekeeping. The African Union has demonstrated its capacity to deploy peacekeeping and mediation missions rapidly to limit the escalation of conflict and human suffering and is ready to take on more responsibility in the short and long-term to assist in maintaining regional peace and security. In meeting the demands of its current undertakings and longer-term objectives, however, the African Union is facing significant challenges.

4. The present report, which was prepared by the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Field Support and Political Affairs, provides an assessment of the recommendations of the African Union-United Nations panel and proposes practical ways in which the United Nations can assist the African Union to enhance its effectiveness in the deployment and management of peacekeeping operations. In preparing this report, the Secretariat consulted closely with the African Union Commission.

5. The first section of the report underscores the importance of a close strategic partnership between the United Nations and the African Union and provides direction with respect to the kind of mechanisms and processes that should be put in place to enhance the partnership between the two organizations. The second section of the report provides an assessment of the various mechanisms available to improve the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations. The third section details the key gaps in the capacity of the African Union to plan, manage, deploy and liquidate peacekeeping operations and proposes a number of measures by which the United Nations can assist in building this capacity. Within the same section, the report provides a summary of the long-term peacekeeping objective of the African Union embodied in the African Standby Force, underlining that many of the challenges that apply to the immediate peacekeeping demands of the African Union will remain relevant in operationalizing the African Standby Force.

6. While the Security Council presidential statement of 18 March 2009 requested that I provide an assessment of the recommendations contained in the report of the panel, in particular those on financing, it is important to bear in mind the position of the African Union on this matter. The African Union Assembly, in its January 2007 decision on the activities of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the state of peace and security in Africa (Assembly/AU/Dec.145 (VIII)), called upon the United Nations to examine, within the context of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, the possibility of funding, through assessed contributions, peacekeeping operations undertaken by the African Union or under its

authority, with the consent of the United Nations. In its communique of 13 March 2009 (PSC/PR/Comm (CLXXVIII)), the African Union Peace and Security Council, while stressing that the report of the panel marked an important step in the overall efforts to enhance the capacity of the African Union to meet the peace and security challenges facing the continent, underlined the need for continued efforts to ensure predictable, sustainable and flexible funding for African Union-led peace support operations. These positions were reiterated by the African Union Commission during its consultations with the Secretariat on the preparation of the present report.

II. Strategic partnership between the United Nations and the African Union

United Nations Security Council and African Union Peace and Security Council

7. In its presidential statement of 28 March 2007 (S/PRST/2007/7), the Security Council recognized the important role of regional organizations in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter. In that regard, the Security Council stressed the importance of supporting and improving in a sustained way the resource base and capacity of the African Union. In my report of 7 April 2008 (S/2008/186), I also underscored the important role of the African Union in the maintenance of regional peace and security and emphasized the need for the United Nations and the African Union to enhance their strategic relationship to ensure a clear and effective division of labour in this regard.

8. Coherence in the decision-making of the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council on issues on the agenda of both organizations is critical in ensuring an effective partnership. This is particularly the case on issues where the two organizations undertake joint mediation and peacekeeping efforts. Enhanced strategic communication and a shared understanding of issues of mutual concern will inform the assumptions on which decisions are made by the respective bodies. Enhanced dialogue on decision-making will improve our collective ability to respond to the many peace and security challenges we face in Africa.

9. In my report of 7 April 2008 (S/2008/186), I noted that further work could be undertaken, with the support of the Secretariat and the African Union Commission, to strengthen coordination and consultation mechanisms between the Councils. This would include: (a) full implementation of provisions of the joint communiqué issued by the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council on 11 June 2007 (S/2007/421 and Corr.1); (b) formalizing the holding, on an annual basis, of the joint meetings between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council; and (c) further sharing of experiences on the working methods between the two bodies. The annual meetings of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council that have taken place over the past three years are a step in the right direction. However, to be truly effective and strategic, these annual meetings require more in-depth preparation and follow-up by the two Councils.

10. Towards this end, in its communique of 13 March 2009 (PSC/PR/Comm (CLXXVIII)), the African Union Peace and Security Council underlined the need to ensure more regular interaction between its Chairperson and the President of the

Security Council, as well as coordination and synchronization between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council in the area of decision-making. Both Councils in their communique of 16 May 2009 (S/2009/303) further "agreed to pursue their consultations on ways and means to strengthen their cooperation and partnership, as well as on the modalities for the organization of their consultations". In this regard, the Peace and Security Council has shared relevant communiqués with the Security Council following its proceedings on areas of mutual interest.

United Nations Secretariat and African Union Commission

11. Both the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council remain responsible for their respective decision-making processes. The coherence of decision-making between the two Councils could enhance an effective strategic and operational partnership between the Secretariat and the Commission in conflict analysis, strategy development and operational planning and vice-versa. The work of the Secretariat and the Commission in this regard should capitalize on the respective comparative advantages of the United Nations and African Union. In its report, the panel highlighted the need for a clearly understood relationship between the Secretariat and the Commission and the establishment of a formal consultation process on issues of mutual interest.

12. At the strategic level, I keep in close contact with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Jean Ping, and my Under-Secretaries-General consult regularly with relevant Commissioners of the African Union Commission on areas of common interest. As recommended by the panel, both Chairperson Ping and I believe that a more structured coordination mechanism should be established between the Secretariat and the Commission at the senior level. In this regard, the United Nations and African Union will set up a joint task force on peace and security, which will meet twice a year at the level of United Nations Under-Secretaries-General and relevant African Union Commissioners to review immediate and long-term strategic and operational issues.

13. At the operational level, this partnership is already evident through our joint work on Darfur, Somalia, capacity-building, mediation and early warning, including in Kenya, Mauritania and Madagascar. There is room to further define the parameters of this partnership through coordinated development of strategic assessments and joint concepts of operation, as well as enhanced communication in management and reporting related to our joint efforts in mediation and peacekeeping. In so doing, we must recognize that the United Nations Secretariat and the African Union Commission may not always agree on all points related to these efforts. The Security Council and the Peace and Security Council may also not always agree on all points on their agenda. We should, however, acknowledge our differences in approach and try to work towards our shared objective in bringing peace and security to conflict areas.

14. In this regard, the United Nations Secretariat will note in its reporting the views of the Peace and Security Council so that the Security Council is fully aware of the views of the Peace and Security Council in its considerations. It is positive to note that the African Union Commission has been reflecting the views of the Security Council in reporting to the Peace and Security Council.

15. It is also important that the Secretariat and the Commission further enhance their regular interaction. A number of channels already exist in support of implementing the 10-year capacity-building programme of 2006, which is the overarching framework for United Nations support to the African Union in the area of peace and security. The annual consultative meetings on conflict prevention, management and resolution or desk-to-desk exchange have led to concrete joint initiatives at the country level. This desk-to-desk exchange is followed up through weekly teleconferences. These meetings cover a broad spectrum of issues, from early warning and conflict prevention to mediation and elections.

16. The desk-to-desk exchange led by the Department of Political Affairs should be broadened to include relevant officers from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, when relevant. The desk-to-desk exchange may also serve as a preparatory mechanism for the annual meetings of the United Nations-African Union task force on peace and security.

17. Regular consultations are also held between the Secretariat and the Office of the Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations in New York, on the one hand, and the Commission and the United Nations Secretariat presence in Addis Ababa on the other. This level of engagement has strengthened information exchange and coordination. I believe our relationship can be further enhanced by restructuring the support provided by the United Nations to the African Union in the area of peace and security, including through integrating the existing Secretariat presence in Addis Ababa. The African Union Commission and the Group of African States agree with this approach. I therefore intend to submit a proposal to the General Assembly that would rationalize and make the presence more effective while minimizing costs.

18. To more effectively engage the Secretariat and Member States on the multitude of African issues on the agenda of the Security Council, the African Union Commission also agrees that it would be important to enhance the capacity of the Office of the Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations, especially in the area of peace and security. I understand that the Commission will make efforts towards this end.

III. Financing for African Union-led, United Nations-authorized peacekeeping operations

19. To date, the African Union and its regional economic communities have mounted peacekeeping operations in Burundi, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and the Sudan. While these missions have demonstrated the value of quick regional response, the ability to implement their respective mandates has often been constrained by a lack of military capabilities, insufficient resources and inadequate institutional capacity to plan, manage, deploy and liquidate operations. As a result, a number of African Union operations have relied heavily on donor and ad hoc support provided by the United Nations, with individual troop-contributing countries playing a critical role in some instances. Despite these challenges, the African Union and its regional economic communities have made substantial progress towards responding to immediate demands for peacekeeping in Africa while, at the same time, working to build capacity in conflict

prevention and resolution, including through the development of the African Standby Force, which is to provide the African Union with a long-term standby peacekeeping capacity.

20. As stressed by the Security Council under resolution 1809 (2008), the unavailability of predictable and sustainable resources limits the ability of the African Union to act, despite its demonstrated political will, to fulfil its commitments to peace and security in Africa. Specifically, the absence of predictable and sustainable funding has been linked to a number of critical operational limitations, including:

(a) The inability to reach mandated troop levels;

(b) Limited operational effectiveness owing to a short-term focus on the availability of funding, as opposed to a longer term strategic focus on achieving the mandate;

(c) In the case of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), a difficult transition from an under-resourced African Union operation to a hybrid peacekeeping operation (the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID));

(d) An unsustainable administrative, coordination and financial management burden placed on a limited African Union capacity by multiple donors' reporting and oversight mechanisms.

Recommendation of the panel

21. In the light of the above, the panel has recommended the use of United Nations-assessed funding to support United Nations-authorized African Union peacekeeping operations for a period of no longer than six months and mostly in kind. The panel recommended that such support be predicated on: (a) a case-by-case approval by the Security Council and General Assembly; and (b) an agreement between the African Union and the United Nations that the mission would transition to United Nations management within six months.

Analysis of the recommendation of the panel

22. The deployment of any peacekeeping operation must be predicated on the principle that it has the necessary support and resources required to implement its mandate. It follows that any operation must be built around the key criteria of predictability, sustainability and flexibility of funding. To date, financing for African Union peacekeeping operations has been provided by the African Union's regular budget or assessed contributions and donor contributions. In Burundi and Liberia, individual troop-contributing countries and African Union member States carried a major part of the financial burden. In the case of AMIS and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) voluntary financing was supplemented by United Nations support packages funded through United Nations assessed contributions.

23. To date five financing mechanisms have been used to fund African Union peacekeeping operations: (a) African Union assessed contributions; (b) contributions

through individual African Union troop-contributing countries; (c) voluntary contributions; (d) United Nations support packages financed through United Nations assessed contributions; and (e) a combination of the above. These mechanisms are reviewed in the following section of this report.

African Union-assessed contributions

24. In establishing the African Union Peace and Security Council in 2004, the African Union also created a Peace Fund to provide the financial resources necessary for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security. The Peace Fund is made up of financial appropriations of 6 per cent from the regular budget of the African Union (including arrears of contributions), voluntary contributions from member States, donors and other sources within Africa, including the private sector, civil society and individuals. On 31 August 2009, in its Tripoli Declaration on the elimination of conflicts in Africa and the promotion of sustainable peace (SP/ASSEMBLY/PS/DECL(I)), the Special Session of the African Union held in Tripoli requested that "the Commission to take the necessary preparatory steps for the increase of the statutory transfer from the African Union regular budget to the Peace Fund from 6 per cent to 12 per cent". In addition, the Assembly requested its member States to make voluntary contributions to the Peace Fund.

25. Since its establishment in 2004, a number of donors have contributed to the Peace Fund to finance peace support operations, mediation and conflict prevention activities. To attract further contributions to the Peace Fund it will be important for the African Union to actively engage in broadening its donor base, including through resource mobilization activities within the continent. In addition, the African Union Commission should put in place a workplan and the adequate financial accountability systems to manage increased donor funding. Ways in which the African Union can enhance its capacity in this area are described in paragraphs 46 and 47.

26. As African countries increase their capacity to provide assessed financing for the African Union peacekeeping operations, it will still be necessary for donors and partners to continue to provide logistics support and voluntary contributions to the African Union. Equally important will be the direct support to troop- and police-contributing countries in the area of equipment, self-sustainment and training, for which there continues to be a dire need.

Contributions from troop-contributing countries

27. African Union troop-contributing countries and member States provide significant resources for African Union peacekeeping operations, as well as those of the regional economic communities. South Africa provided a major contribution in taking the lead nation role in Burundi under the African Union, while Nigeria and a number of West African troop-contributing countries have done the same in Sierra Leone and Liberia under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). African member States have also provided air support for troop movements. Moreover, the cost of preparation and deployment of troops by African troop-contributing countries is not always fully reimbursed by donor contributions.

28. While the expenditures undertaken and the lead role played by African troop-contributing countries in deploying operations has been considerable, it cannot be

relied upon to cover all the requirements of a peacekeeping operation. Considerable bilateral donor support continues to be required and interoperable, central communications and headquarters mechanisms will need to be supported at the African Union or regional economic community level. As with other voluntary resources mechanisms, reliance on troop-contributing countries, even with bilateral support, will require that complex and time-consuming coordination efforts be addressed to ensure a more flexible response to requirements as they arise.

Voluntary contributions

29. Voluntary contributions have indeed facilitated the deployment and maintenance of African Union peacekeeping operations. In particular, the European Union-funded Africa Peace Facility provides a major financing mechanism, which has made available over €400 million for the period 2004-2007 and €300 million for the period 2008-2010 to support peace and security in Africa, including €200 million for peace support operations, €65 million for capacity-building of the African Peace and Security Architecture, €15 million for early response mechanisms and €20 million for contingencies.

30. Lessons from AMIS demonstrate, however, that voluntary contributions have lacked predictability and have often not been sufficient to cover all requirements of full-fledged peacekeeping operations. In addition, the coordination of voluntary contributions from a number of donors can be complex and lead to gaps. In AMIS, for example, voluntary contributions helped to sustain the Mission, but despite the best efforts of the United Nations to coordinate the funding that was provided in kind and through direct transfers, key requirements of AMIS went unfunded or experienced significant delays.

31. For voluntary contributions to conceivably meet the financial requirements of full-fledged African Union operations, donors would have to strengthen the predictability of these resources and, in this regard, take into account the full costs of an operation from the start with a plan to meeting the full financial requirements prior to deployment. Experience has shown that meeting all the requirements of a full-fledged peacekeeping operation such as AMIS or AMISOM will require a level of funding that donors have not met thus far. For example, while the Africa Peace Facility has made a significant contribution by making available approximately $100 million per year over a three-year period to fund peacekeeping operations and early response mechanisms these funds alone would not be able to finance a full-fledged peacekeeping operation. This point is illustrated by comparison when reviewing AMISOM's logistics support requirements alone, to be provided out of the United Nations support package, which amount to approximately $210 million over a nine-month period.

32. In addition, for voluntary financing for peacekeeping to be effective, donors must adjust their disbursement and reporting procedures to make the provision of funds as predictable and flexible as possible. It should be noted that the management of AMIS was also impeded by complicated procedures, delays in disbursements and a reliance on donor-selected contractors.

33. At the same time, donors and the African Union will need to address the complex coordination challenge to maximize resources and avoid delays and gaps that have undermined missions in the past. In this regard, it will be important for donors and partners to harmonize reporting requirements, coordinate effectively

among themselves and assist in building African Union capacity in the area of reporting.

34. To maximize the effectiveness of voluntary contributions, the African Union, with the support of the United Nations, could consider establishing a standing, flexible trust fund for African Union peacekeeping operations within the framework of the African Union Peace Fund, which, if contributed to with adequate resources, could provide the predictability and sustainability required for mounting peacekeeping operations. The United Nations could assist the African Union with financial management and oversight of the trust fund, while at the same time building capacity with the African Union. If the funds in the trust fund are not adequate to meet the requirements of a peacekeeping operation, the Security Council could consider authorizing a supplementary United Nations support package. The effectiveness of such a mechanism would depend on the willingness of donors to contribute to a trust fund and the flexibility and speed with which these funds could be released for peacekeeping operations.

United Nations support packages financed by assessed contributions

35. Acknowledging the existing gaps between voluntary support and operational requirements, the General Assembly has authorized United Nations support packages for African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the Security Council to ensure sustainability and facilitate the eventual transition to a United Nations operation. The support packages authorized assessed funding for specific areas under the Light and Heavy Support Packages for AMIS and the Logistics Support Package for AMISOM. These areas included the payment of troop costs and allowances to AMIS troops prior to the transfer of authority to UNAMID and logistics support to AMISOM, including the provision of equipment and services normally provided to United Nations peacekeeping missions. Within the various components of funding provided through the AMIS and AMISOM support packages, United Nations assessed funds have been applied to most categories of expenditure applicable to a United Nations peacekeeping mission.

36. Based on experiences to date, support packages do not necessarily provide the sustainability and predictability required to effectively support the start-up of a peacekeeping operation. To be successful, it is critical that support packages are authorized early and receive all of the required assets. In the case of AMIS and AMISOM, the United Nations support packages were authorized between 18 months to two years after the African Union mission was already operating on the ground. For the AMIS support package to have facilitated more effectively the transfer of authority to the United Nations, it would have needed to have come into effect at the start of deployment. Furthermore, the experience of the Heavy Support Package, where critical force multipliers or enabling units that were authorized were not provided, demonstrates another possible limitation on the effectiveness of support packages that contain military components.

37. The use of United Nations assessed contributions would underline the political support of the Security Council for peacekeeping operations conducted by a regional organization. In this regard, if United Nations support packages are to be authorized in the future, as a matter of principle, United Nations support should only be considered in cases where consultations between the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council take place to ensure the

political and security objectives of these operations are aligned prior to either body authorizing the establishment and deployment of such an operation.

38. As noted by the panel in its report, the use of United Nations assessed contributions for an African Union-led operation should be predicated on the assumption that the intention of the Security Council would be for the mission to transition to the United Nations. Such an arrangement should also aim to establish an African Union mission to United Nations standards to the extent possible, which would not only maximize the likelihood of success at the start-up phase, but would also facilitate the transition process to ultimately take place.

39. Moreover, as also noted by the panel, the provision of a United Nations support package financed by United Nations assessed contributions would entail a case-by-case authorization by the United Nations Security Council. Upon such an authorization, the General Assembly would determine the scope of the support package and the level of assessed contributions that would be provided, as is the case with United Nations peacekeeping operations. Funding authorized by the United Nations would be subject to United Nations management regulations and procedures and would therefore have to be accompanied by a United Nations management and accountability structure.

40. In addition, it would be critical to ensure that there is prior agreement between the African Union and the United Nations on the scope of activities that would fall under the parameters of the support package. Support packages would only include elements of the operation that would normally be covered for a United Nations peacekeeping operation. As with United Nations peacekeeping operations, financing for certain activities would have to be sought from voluntary sources, either through a specific mission trust fund or coordination with the United Nations country team and donor community.

Combination of various mechanisms

41. In some circumstances the international community has chosen to provide resources to the African Union for its peacekeeping operations using a combination of the aforementioned mechanisms. While it is still premature to conduct a full-lessons-learned exercise of AMISOM, some emerging trends are pertinent to this analysis. For example, support for the AMISOM operation is provided through three channels: a United Nations logistics support package funded through United Nations assessed contributions; voluntary contributions channelled through a United Nations trust fund; and bilateral funding and support arrangements.

42. The resulting multiple sources of funding have required a significant amount of coordination in order to minimize gaps and duplication. The multiple sources of funding have also created parallel management and accountability frameworks for the same operation. Given the developing administrative and financial management capacity within the African Union, these multiple fund sources and parallel structures are likely to impact on the long-term capacity-building programme of the African Union.

43. At the request of the Security Council, the General Assembly's authorization for assessed contributions applies only to a logistics package. As a result, there is continued reliance on voluntary funding sources to meet non-logistical requirements. This exposes AMISOM to the risk that resources will not be provided

on a sustainable or predictable basis, reinforcing the lessons noted in paragraph 18, particularly in regard to achieving mandated troop levels.

IV. Building institutional capacity for peacekeeping operations

44. In addition to obtaining sustainable, predictable and flexible financial resources to mount peacekeeping operations, the African Union Commission's major challenge is the lack of sufficient institutional capacity in key management, support and strategic planning functions. This capacity is required to address both its immediate peacekeeping demands and its longer-term goal of operationalizing the African Standby Force.

45. The United Nations is currently working with the African Union Commission through a number of peacekeeping capacity-building initiatives. This assistance is built around the following principles:

(a) Consultation between the Secretariat and Commission prior to the deployment of an African Union peacekeeping operation for which the African Union may request United Nations Secretariat support for planning or other technical assistance;

(b) Requirements to be identified by the African Union, as above, and driven by the African Union Commission's capacity to absorb assistance;

(c) United Nations support to be provided within the context of concurrent demands to support United Nations field operations;

(d) The African Union would ultimately develop a capacity that is best suited to its own needs; United Nations systems must not be simply exported but should be seen as a resource that the African Union can adapt to meet its own unique requirements;

(e) United Nations technical assistance would be provided to the extent possible by the highest calibre personnel with current field experience in African-based peacekeeping operations.

46. Under the auspices of the 2006 United Nations-African Union 10-year capacity-building programme, support is provided to a range of activities from early warning and conflict prevention to peacekeeping and conflict resolution through training, staff exchanges and knowledge sharing. In particular, the Departments of Political Affairs, Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support have a number of initiatives under way that include capacity-building in mediation, elections, conflict resolution, early warning, peacekeeping planning and operations, rule of law and security sector reform. Further detail on these initiatives is available in my report of 7 April 2008 on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the African Union (S/2008/186). The 10-year capacity-building programme will be reviewed and evaluated at the end of this year.

47. In addition to the ongoing activities within the 10-year capacity-building programme, the panel recommended that the African Union identify its priorities for personnel training, particularly in those areas dealing with financial administration, logistics and administration. In its presidential statement of 18 March (S/PRST/2009/3), the Security Council further requested that the Secretariat and the Commission collaborate in developing a list of capacity needs.

48. Following extensive consultations, the Secretariat and the Commission have confirmed that the African Union should further develop all areas of support to enable it to effectively plan, manage, deploy and liquidate peacekeeping operations. This requires the African Union to develop its structure and identify the core functions necessary for its peacekeeping operations, including those in addition to the Directorate for Peace and Security. A broad, inter-departmental plan and road map for capacity-building should be developed as early as possible, with the support of the United Nations and partners, as required. The capacity-building road map would also provide a framework through which other partners and donors could focus assistance programmes, a timetable for implementation, and financing mechanisms. To ensure African Union ownership, the structure and core posts should be approved by the African Union member States and financed from the African Union regular budget.

49. In addition to the development of a capacity-building road map, the United Nations will undertake a number of short and medium to long-term initiatives that can help the African Union address some of its key deficiencies in the areas of finance, logistics, human resources and procurement. The initiatives should be governed by a framework agreement, to be explored, and on a cost recovery basis where applicable. A comprehensive, joint United Nations-African Union study of lessons learned from the Light and Heavy Support packages for AMIS, the logistics package for AMISOM as well as collaboration under UNAMID and the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), with a view to identifying best practices, will inform the development of these initiatives, in particular those for the medium to long term.

Short-term support initiatives

(a) Access to the United Nations peacekeeping Intranet site (peacekeeping policies and procedures) to be granted to the African Union Commission; this would provide the African Union with a self-learning repository of knowledge;

(b) Embedding several African Union human resources personnel at United Nations Headquarters to observe the United Nations system at work in the first instance, along with the creation of some senior capacity within the African Union Peacekeeping Support Team of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to act as a conduit between the Department of Field Support and the African Union to share best and emerging practices;

(c) Information exchange with the African Union regarding United Nations vendors and contracts, including standard cost manuals, to assist the African Union in improving its procurement and contract management capacity;

(d) Subject to capacity, a team of AMISOM representatives, including African Union troop-contributor representatives, to be embedded within the UNSOA structure to learn the evolving lessons of the UNSOA/AMISOM experience;

(e) A framework to be identified for continued sharing of United Nations experiences and knowledge on logistic base operations;

(f) United Nations peacekeeping budgetary preparation package and templates to be shared with the African Union Commission, including a training programme for its use. As part of this programme, a "crosswalk" between African

Union and United Nations budgetary systems could be developed to facilitate harmonized financial reporting frameworks;

(g) Familiarization visits to United Nations peacekeeping operations and United Nations Headquarters;

(h) Access to the capacities in the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, including the Engineering Design Centre and Geographical Information Systems Centre.

Medium to Long-Term Support Initiatives

(a) The United Nations could provide a "standby arrangement" to assist the African Union to deploy a mission consisting of the following:

(i) A surge capacity comprising a small team of experienced United Nations personnel in critical "start-up" functions such as planning, financial management, procurement, receipt and inspection, engineering and supply. These personnel would be drawn from United Nations peacekeeping missions and would deploy on temporary duty to support the establishment of an African Union mission. In line with the principle of African Union ownership, they would perform assisting roles only and would not be expected to perform managerial functions;

(ii) Access to Strategic Deployment Stocks, existing United Nations systems contracts and strategic lift capacities;

(b) African Union personnel to be incorporated into existing Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support/Department of Political Affairs training and capacity-building programmes;

(c) A temporary assignment programme to be implemented in which African Union staff are deployed to United Nations peacekeeping operations and Headquarters for periods of between three and six months. The modalities of such a programme would include a commitment from the Secretariat not to recruit those personnel for an appropriate time following the end of their temporary assignment. The programme would be supplemented by training and familiarization in critical operational processes and systems including human resources, procurement, financial management, legal support, property management, logistics planning and delegation of authority. They would be used by the African Union as a base for the development of their own management systems;

(d) The African Union should establish a dedicated and integral training capacity to cover all of the Commission directorates, including policies and procedures and training-the-trainers. The United Nations could assist the African Union to establish such a capacity.

The African Standby Force

50. The capacities required to address the African Union's immediate peacekeeping demands are commensurate to those it requires to manage and operate the African Standby Force. Under the broad framework for conflict resolution through the African Peace and Security Architecture, the African Union's long-term peacekeeping objective is the development of the African Standby Force. Based on five multidimensional regional brigades under the framework of five Regional

Economic Communities, each unit includes a military element based on a brigade of approximately 5,000, as well as police and civilian components that can rapidly respond to peace and security-related needs. While the African Standby Force has the potential to make a major contribution to peace and security in Africa, it will require long-term financial, material and logistics commitment from partners and increasingly from the member States of the African Union.

51. In order for the African Standby Force to be operational, the African Union and its Regional Economic Communities must also have the capacity to generate units at the required state of readiness for its equipment/capabilities, within a fully integrated support structure, and within a defined command and control architecture. As envisioned in the African Standby Force concept, these brigades must also have robust, organic enablers, including engineering, communications, medical, aviation, transport and maintenance elements. These enablers must be established within a clearly understood logistic framework and equipped to standards that can withstand harsh and demanding operations.

52. It is also critical that the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities clarify the process that will govern the mandating of the African Standby Force, establish an understanding on rapid deployment and delineate clearly the command and control structures on the basis of the relevant provisions of the African Union Peace and Security Protocol and the January 2008 memorandum of understanding between the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities. The African Union should also establish a method by which it can monitor levels and standards of equipment/capabilities to ensure that they are at the appropriate state of readiness. Such methods would help identify key support deficiencies prior to deployment. In addition, the African Union should further refine its African Standby Force logistic support concept to ensure that the respective responsibilities and the division of labour between the African Union Commission and the Regional Economic Communities are clearly articulated.

53. In order to address these key challenges and operationalize the African Standby Force, a series of regional training exercises have taken place and are programmed throughout 2009. The central pillar of this process is the African Union's continental exercise "*Amani* Africa", which will take place in 2010 to review the mandating processes of the African Peace and Security Architecture by which the African Standby Force is deployed; to exercise the African Union and regional structures that support the African Standby Force concept; and to evaluate development of the African Standby Force to date and draw lessons learned by which further development activities will be adjusted accordingly.

Logistics support capacity

54. Among the urgent capacity requirements for the African Union is the provision of logistical support to its peacekeeping operations and, eventually, for the African Standby Force. In this regard, the panel recommended that the African Union consider developing its logistics capacity and explore innovative options, including commercial multifunction contracts or logistics augmentation programmes in order to avoid the necessity of stockpiling large quantities of equipment and the costs of maintenance.

55. The African Union will need to develop its own support capacity, which would include the enabling elements of each of the five brigades, the support chain

mechanisms to be provided by the continental and regional bases, and a tailored commercial multifunctional contract or a Logistics Civil Augmentation Programme (LOGCAP) to round up an integrated support architecture.

56. The characteristics of the commercial logistic contract and the extent to which it is required will depend on the progress of the African Standby Force and, critically, the capacity of its enablers and supply chain mechanisms. Once the support capacity of the African Standby Force develops to the desired standard, the menu of additional support services required for operations will be reduced. A LOGCAP contract could then provide the mission with an effective, agile support capacity. A reduced menu of services, lower costs and less onerous management requirements would make this option a highly desirable and responsive solution. The challenge is to identify and mobilize commercial sources of logistic support during the development phase. A commercial multi-functional contract, while offering certain benefits, would be extremely costly and difficult to manage. The United Nations has moved away from this approach because of the high costs, and procurement and management complexities and prefers, instead, to utilize a series of targeted support contracts. This more flexible option could also be pursued by the African Union with the assistance of partners and the United Nations. Ideally, however, the development of support capacity within the brigades of the African Standby Force is the key to minimizing the complexity of a centralized support structure.

Financing for capacity-building

57. As noted above, there are many capacity-building initiatives under way by donors and partners in the area of peace and security. At the moment, these initiatives are not fully coordinated and often overlap. The panel noted that at the time of its report there were over 130 different contributions channelled to the African Union, each with its own reporting and monitoring requirements. The result is an overwhelmed African Union administrative capacity caught in a continued donor reporting and audit cycle and, as a result, struggling to build capacity or effect change and improvement to the existing system and thereby address underlying donor concerns.

Recommendation of the panel

58. The panel recommended the following steps:

(a) The development by the African Union of a comprehensive plan for long-term capacity-building;

(b) The establishment of a multi-donor trust fund into which existing sources of support would be consolidated and a standard format for reporting to all donors be developed;

(c) The creation of a policy board with representation from the African Union, the United Nations and major donors, to provide policy guidance and oversee the activities of the trust fund;

(d) As a transitional measure, the administration of the fund by an agency until sufficient capacity is established within the African Union.

Analysis of the recommendation of the panel

59. I fully share the views of the panel as to the requirement for a long-term, comprehensive capacity-building plan. Although the recent experience of the United Nations support to AMISOM included the establishment of a trust fund for a peacekeeping operation and not a trust fund for capacity-building, it nonetheless provides a useful example in assessing the recommendation of the panel on multi-donor trust fund financing mechanisms for capacity-building. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1863 (2009), in April 2009 the United Nations and African Union organized an international donor conference on Somalia to support a multi-donor trust fund established for AMISOM.

60. The creation of the multi-donor trust fund was predicated on the assumption that the benefits of strong United Nations management and oversight framework, coupled with a special programme support cost of 5 per cent (as compared to the United Nations standard of 13 per cent) would be an attractive option for potential donors. Actual pledges to the trust fund, however, amounted to only approximately 15 per cent of total pledges made. As noted above, the majority of donors preferred to contribute through direct arrangements. Consultations with various donors, as well as the experience of the African Union Commission in this regard, suggest that the same preference would apply to financing for capacity-building.

61. A significantly strengthened coordination mechanism is required to address both programmatic and administrative challenges across the entire range of donor and African Union programmes in the area of peace and security. Equally important is a commitment from donors that efforts will be made to better coordinate their programmes. Efforts are currently under way to harmonize programmatic reporting requirements for donor contributions. The extension of these efforts to include a single financial reporting format along with a common audit function, agreed to by all partners, would be a further significant improvement that would enhance the ability of the African Union to implement its capacity-building strategy. Such a mechanism, coupled with a focused plan and a road map for capacity-building, would generate most of the benefits that could otherwise be derived from the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund.

62. The United Nations can facilitate this process through a number of initiatives, including a discussion with the African Union and partners on the possibility of developing a harmonized administrative and financial management framework that could consolidate funding based on a limited number of thematic programmes. United Nations support could also include the provision of technical expertise in financial management policies and procedures as well as the leveraging of the United Nations experience of standardized reporting and oversight mechanisms for donor contributions.

63. These initiatives would provide a technical basis upon which harmonization could be built. As also noted by the panel, any effort to coordinate must, however, be accompanied by a corresponding commitment on the part of all stakeholders.

V. Observations

64. Regional organizations play an increasingly active role in supporting the Security Council, under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, in

carrying out its primary responsibilities in the maintenance of peace and security. In this context, the enhanced peacekeeping role of the African Union and its subregional organizations is a major and welcome development. They have been able to deploy quickly, with limited resources and as a first response, when challenging circumstances have required a robust intervention. The African Union has taken on responsibilities in complex political environments with the authorization of the Security Council, often in cases where the African Union has a comparative advantage and where conditions have not been conducive to a United Nations peacekeeping role or where the United Nations and the broader international community have been divided on the best course of action.

65. I am fully committed to supporting the African Union as it fulfils its potential as a partner of the United Nations in pursuit of peace in Africa. In the present report, I have made a number of proposals that I believe will strengthen the strategic partnership between the two organizations. I have also sought to describe a series of short-term and long-term actions that the United Nations can take to build the capacity of the African Union to undertake successful peacekeeping operations. I applaud the efforts being taken by donors and reiterate the need to work together, within the framework of a focused framework to build the capacity of the African Union.

66. I have also emphasized the requirement for the provision of sustainable and predictable resources to ensure success of African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations. I have provided an assessment of various mechanisms that may assist the Security Council and the General Assembly in exploring means to assist the African Union in supporting peacekeeping operations authorized by the Security Council.

67. Ultimately, it will be the responsibility of African Union member States to provide the necessary resources to the African Union's peacekeeping interventions. In this regard, I welcome the decision of the African Union to increase the allotment of the regular budget to the African Union Peace Fund. This is especially important in addressing the challenges that the African Union may face in financing for the African Standby Force and other peacekeeping operations it undertakes under the sole authorization of the African Union Peace and Security Council.

68. When peacekeeping is determined the best course of action to address a conflict in Africa, it is essential that the United Nations and the African Union work together to build consensus and support for the operation and to align mandates with objectives and available resources. Thorough strategic and operational coordination and consultation is required between the Secretariat and the Commission and between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council before the African Union mandates a peacekeeping operation. This would allow early identification of requirements for United Nations financial and peacekeeping capacity support and would also facilitate planning for possible transition to a United Nations operation, if there would be an intention by the Security Council.

69. At the same time, it is important to recall that peacekeeping is part of a political solution, not an alternative. Efforts must continue to be made in parallel to enhance and support preventive diplomacy, early warning, and conflict resolution and mediation. Peacekeeping operations should only be embarked upon after careful consideration of all available response options and must be accompanied by a viable political strategy and a set of clear objectives. The overall strategy and objectives

must be shared by the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council, particularly when the organizations undertake joint mediation and peacekeeping operations or when the Security Council authorizes an African Union-led mission supported by United Nations support packages.

70. In closing, I would like to thank the members of the African Union-United Nations Panel, chaired by Romano Prodi, for their pioneering work on this issue. I would also like to thank the Chairperson of the African Union, Jean Ping, and his colleagues in the African Union Commission, as well as the Group of African States, African Member States and donors, for their support and for working with the United Nations on the proposals presented in this report. I look forward to our continued close collaboration in the future as the United Nations and the African Union work to strengthen their partnership in peace and security.